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The Politics and Indirect Effects of Asymmetrical 
Bargaining Power in Free Trade Agreements 
Meredith Kolsky Lewis 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been, and continues to be, shaped 
in its agreements and institutional foci in significant part by political pressures 
emanating from its members, particularly those able to wield the most influ-
ence. Rather than being an institution with the singular focus of achieving free 
trade among all members, the WTO comprises a complex set of agreements, 
many of which represent a politically driven compromise among members 
as to how to manage trade rather than to liberalize it.' Although the state of 
WTO liberalization reflects positions agreed to in part as a result of political 
realities, the reach of politics is more significant in the context of bilateral 
trade negotiations. Indeed, what members cannot accomplish through the 
WTO they may try to achieve through free trade agreements (FTAs), particu-
larly with politically or economically weaker trade partners. In the case of the 
United States, FTAs have been used as an opportunity to impose provisions 
favored by domestic constituents - such as strengthened intellectual property 
provisions and labor and environment clauses - that it has not been able to 
get WTO members to agree to collectively in the multilateral forum. A sim-
ilar phenomenon has occurred with respect to the European Union (EU) 
1 See, e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, "Reciprocity, Non-Discrimination and Preferential Agreements 
in the Multilateral Trading System," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
5932 (1997), at 1 (noting that the CATI establishes goals of reciprocity and nondiscrimination, 
but not of free trade). 
Note: I owe thanks to the participants of the ASIL International Economic Law Interest Croup 
2oo8 Biennial Conference for their feedback on this chapter, and particularly owe gratitude to Joel 
Trachtman for his helpful comments. I also thank the editors and peer reviewers of this volume 
for their valuable suggestions. 
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and its FTA partners.2 For countries with less bargaining power, the WfO's 
multilateral setting provides some buffer from power politics3 in the form of 
the consensus decision-making practice4 and the disproportionate number of 
developing and least-developed countries. Countries with limited bargaining 
power will often find themselves in a relatively more vulnerable position in the 
bilateral or even plurilateral context.5 For poorer countries, this may translate 
into giving significant concessions in FT A negotiations out of concern that aid 
or other preferential treatment will be withdrawn.6 
In critiquing FT As as a negative for the multilateral trading system, commen-
tators have addressed numerous issues, including the potential for such agree-
ments to be more trade diverting than trade creating;7 that FTA negotiations 
necessarily detract resources and attention from multilateral negotiations;8 that 
the plethora of regional arrangements is undermining the most-favored nation 
(MFN) principle;9 and arguments that particular agreements have unfortunate 
2 Harpaz, "When East Meets West: Approximation of Laws in the EU-Mediterranean Context," 
43 Common Market L. Rev. (2oo6) 993, at 999 (discussing the expectation by the EU that 
in connection with its European Neighbourhood Policy, its Mediterranean neighbors will 
unilaterally "approximate" or align their legislation to some degree to that of the EU rather 
than having the parties engage in a cooperative process of give and take). 
3 See Matteo and Wunsch-Vincent, "Pre-empting Protectionism in Services: The GATS and 
Outsourcing," 7 f. lnt'l Econ. L. (2004) 765, at 787 ("in a world of unequal bargaining power, 
multilaterally agreed formulae ... are likely to produce a more favourable outcome for the 
weaker party than bilateral negotiations."). 
4 See Abbott, "A New Dominant Trade Species Emerges: Is Bilateralism a Threat?," 10 f. Int'l 
Econ. L. (2oo7) 571, at 583 (arguing that "weaker actors have a better chance to have their 
voices heard, and their policy choices taken into account" in the multilateral consensus-based 
system). 
5 See, e.g., Hirsch, "The Sociology oflnternational Economic Law: Sociological Analysis of the 
Regulation of Regional Agreements in the World Trading System," 19 Eur f. lnt'l L. (2oo8) 
277, at 295-296 (identifying the social conflict conception of international economic law as 
disfavoring IT As because developing states will achieve better outcomes through the collective 
action of the WTO than through FTA negotiations that will reflect the power asymmetries 
between the parties). Bagwell and Staiger conclude that ITAs prevent the implementation 
of an efficient multilateral agreement based on the GATT pillars of nondiscrimination and 
reciprocity. See Bagwell and Staiger, "An Economic Theory of GATT," Wisconsin Madison-
Social Systems Working Paper 15 (June 1998), at 33· 
6 For example, as will be subsequently discussed, the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) countries 
signed the PACER agreement with Australia and New Zealand in part out offear that the 
latter would terminate the agreement known as SPARTECA, pursuant to which the PIF 
countries receive largely duty-free access to the Australian and New Zealand markets and do 
not have to provide preferential market access in return. 
7 J. Viner, The Customs Union Issue (1950). 
8 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 4, at 581. 
9 See, e.g., Sutherland et a!., "The Future of the WTO, Addressing Institutional Challenges 
in the New Millenium," Report by the Consultative Board to Director-General Supachai 
Panitchpakdi (2005). 
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terms such as TRIPS-plus provisions (where TRIPS stands for the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). To these critiques 
this chapter adds an additional reason to disfavor FTAs by arguing that FTAs 
can have a further negative effect of constraining the future policy choices of 
countries that are not party to the original FT As and therefore did not have 
the opportunity to negotiate or bargain with respect to terms that later end up 
having spillover effects on these nonparties. 
This chapter argues that in addition to the direct impacts of political pressure 
the weaker party to an FTA experiences in the form of "take it or leave it" 
terms, those terms can also cause additional difficulties in an indirect way, 
including those for nonparties to the agreement, by effectively constraining 
policy choices outside the context of the original FT A. In this context "weaker· 
members"'0 can include developed countries as well when their FTA partners 
are more powerfu1,11 as is the case with Australia relative to the United States 
and to some degree New Zealand relative to Australia.'' 
This chapter uses examples from Oceania to illustrate the negative external-
ities that earlier-negotiated FTAs can have on nonparties to those agreements. 
Using two specific regional examples as illustrations, the chapter argues that, as 
10 In this chapter the term "weak" is used to describe countries with relatively less bargaining 
power in trade negotiations than the countries with which they are negotiating, and "strong" 
or "powerful" is used to describe countries with relatively more bargaining power. 
11 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 4, at 571, noting that the "PTA negotiating environment strongly 
favors powerful economic actors like the United States and European Union, which are largely 
dictating terms to developing (and developed) countries." See also Harpaz, supra note 2. 
12 For examples of developed countries in the "weaker country" position, see, e.g., Crump, 
"Global Trade Policy Development in a Two-Track System," 9 J. lnt'l Econ. L. (2oo6) 487 
(identifying examples of Singapore capitulating to demands of Australia; Singapore giving in 
to demands of the United States; and Australia reluctantly accepting terms dictated by the 
United States in their respective FTA negotiations). Crump provides a useful example in the 
context of the types of rules of origin (ROO) provisions 'chosen in various FTAs. In 1983, 
New Zealand and Australia chose a value-added ROO system for their trade agreement (the 
Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship Trade Agreement, or ANZCERTA). 
Subsequently, when Australia negotiated its FTA with Singapore, Singapore pushed for a 
change in tariff classification or transformation measure for ROO, but Australia insisted on the 
value-added ROO methodology used in ANZCERTA On the flip side, when Australia later 
negotiated its FTA with the United States and was the weaker of the two parties, it capitulated 
to U.S. demands for the type of ROO methodology Australia had rejected when it had been 
proposed by Singapore. Ibid., at 502. The phenomenon of FTA provisions having spillover 
effects for others is akin to findings of "regulatory ell.-port" from stronger to weaker countries, 
in which the United States and the EU tend to be the exporters and a wide range of other 
countries the importers. See, e.g., Raustiala, "The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks & the Future of International Law," 43 Va. f. Int'l L. (2002) 1; 
Slaughter, "Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order," 40 Stan. J. Int'l L. (2004) 
283, at 293-297 (discussing Raustiala's findings). 
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a result of the power imbalances in many IT A negotiations and of path depen-
dence among ITAs, the terms agreed to in earlier ITAs can subsequently 
constrain negotiating space and policy options for other trading partners and 
political allies.'3 
In the first case, Australia succumbed to the United States' superior bargain-
ing power in the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSITA)'4 
negotiations by agreeing to various exceptions to liberalization commitments 
and to terms with which it was not happy. The success of U.S. pressure has 
resulted in changes in Australian law. Although these changes clearly have 
direct effects on Australia, they also have repercussions for New Zealand, 
because under the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement (ANZCERTA or CER) and related treaties,'5 Australia and New 
Zealand engage jointly in certain regulatory activities and seek broadly to cre-
ate a harmonized business environment.'6 Thus, Australia's agreement under 
the AUSITA to impose heightened intellectual property protections and to 
enact regulations on pharmaceuticals has potential indirect effects on New 
Zealand, which does not impose such protections or regulations. Although 
New Zealand would not otherwise adopt such regulations, it will now be futile 
on the part of New Zealand to try to persuade Australia to revert to its previous 
regulations, because of the bind established by the AUSITA terms all but 
imposed by the United States.'7 
In the second illustrative case, Pacific Island Forum (PIF) members have 
very little bargaining power relative to Australia and New Zealand, and they 
have had agreement terms essentially dictated to them by their larger, wealthier 
neighbors.'8 The terms of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Rela-
tions (PACER)'9 are now resulting in the PIF countries' experiencing pressure 
'3 In addition to these effects there are, of course, the more visible examples ofu:s.- or EO-drafted 
template agreements being virtually imposed upon future generations of partners to trade and 
investment agreements. 
14 Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), Wf/REGt84, entry into force 
January 1, 2005. 
'> The ANZCERTA comprises a number of instruments, including the Trans-Tasman Mutual 
Recognition Arrangement, the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, and several other docu-
ments; these may be accessed at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Australiah-CERJ 
o-cer-timeline.php. 
16 Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), 
Wf/REGm, entry into force January 1, 1983. 
'7 This can also be seen as a form of path dependence. For a discussion of sequencing path 
dependence see Hathaway, "Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System," 86/owa L. Rev. (2001) 601, at 617-622. 
'
8 In particular the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations, discussed herein. 
'9 See the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations, made at Nauru, August 18, 2001, 
entry into force October 3, 2002, which is discussed herein. PACER is an umbrella agreement 
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from these traditional allies20 and are constraining the PIF countries in decid-
ing how to approach negotiations with the EU to form potential economic 
partnership agreements.21 
The negative externalities that result when FTA terms are imposed by 
stronger FT A partners on weaker ones create legitimacy concerns about FT As 
above and beyond those already identified in the literature. It is problematic 
that countries not party to an FTA or its negotiations nonetheless find their 
policy options negatively constrained. This is an issue the WTO has not 
considered, but it would be worthy of attention in the context of attempting to 
reform General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIV. 
2. THE AUSFTA AND ITS INDIRECT IMPLICATIONS 
FOR NEW ZEALAND 
After several years of negotiations, the AUSFT A came into effect on January 1, 
2005. Although the agreement was widely supported by Australian businesses, 
the negotiating process22 and substantive provisions have been criticized on a 
number of grounds. The most frequent criticisms have been addressed at the 
TRIPS-plus intellectual property provisions the AUSFT A contains, provisions 
relating to Australia's Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, and the effects these 
provisions collectively may have on the availability of! ow-cost pharmaceutical 
products in Australia.23 However, the agreement has also been criticized more 
rather than an FT A itself. It contains provisions relating to the formation of the Pacific Island 
Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), and in this way Australia and New Zealand, although 
not parties to PICTA, have influenced that agreement by means of the PACER Agreement. 
For the text of PACER see http://www.forumsec.org/UserFiles!File/PACER.. Text. pdf. 
20 See generally Kelsey, "Big Brothers Behaving Badly: The Implications for the Pacific Islands 
of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER)," Interim Report, commis-
sioned by the Pacific Network on Globalisation (2004). 
21 See Part III of this chapter. 
22 See, e.g., Mitchell, "The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement," in Laurence Boulle 
et al. (eds.), Challenges to Multilateral Trade: The Impact of Bilateral, Preferential and 
Regional Agreements (zooS) 115, at 117-uS (criticizing the limited parliamentary scrutiny treaties 
receive in Australia, and the limited role interested stakeholders had in the treaty negotiating 
process). 
'3 See, e.g., Faunce, Johnston, and Bambrick, "The Trans-Tasman Therapeutic Products Author-
ity: Potential AUSFTA Impacts on Safety and Cost-Effectiveness Regulation for Medicines and 
Medical Devices in New Zealand," 37 Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev. (2oo6) 365 (hereinafter 
Faunce et al., "Trans-Tasman"); Faunce and Lexchin, '"Linkage' Pharmaceutical Evergreen-
ing in Canada and Australia," 4:8Australia and New Zealand Health Policy (2007), accessible at 
http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4f1/8 (hereinafter Faunce and Lexchin, "Evergreen-
ing"); Mercurio, "The Impact of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement on the 
Provision of Health Services in Australia," 26 Whittier L. Rev. (2005) 1051; Chalmers, "Ever-
green or Deciduous? Australian Trends in Relation to the 'Evergreening' of Patents," ;30 Melb. 
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generally as being a bad deal for Australia. Andrew Mitchell put it bluntly: 
The AUSFTA provides an illustration of the outcomes that countries with 
relatively little bargaining and economic power can expect from an FTA 
with the US. It also serves as a warning of how even an economically suc-
cessful developed country may end up sacrificing its welfare, public policies, 
and democratic processes in a dogged pursuit to cement relations with the 
United States, in a manner that would be unlikely in the vigorous negotiating 
environment of the Wf0.24 
One might dismiss such criticisms on the basis that Australia was aware of its 
limited bargaining power and nonetheless determined that it was worthwhile to 
enter into an ITA with the United States, even though it had to accept certain 
terms it did not like. Although this may be the case, this chapter focuses on 
a separate point: that Australia's decision to accept the U.S.'s terms in the 
AUSFT A affects not just Australia but also its neighbor across the Tasman. To 
the extent that the AUSFTA results in higher prices for pharmaceuticals in 
Australia, for example, New Zealanders' access to affordable pharmaceuticals 
is also potentially at stake as a result of the relationship between Australia and 
New Zealand that was established in the Australia-New Zealand CER and its 
flow-on agreements. In particular, because Australia has committed to certain 
provisions in the AU SIT A, it wiil seek to have relevant arrangements with New 
Zealand conform to its existing commitments. New Zealand is thus a victim 
of path-dependent externalities in the form of regulations Australia has agreed 
to adopt by virtue of its negotiations with the United States - negotiations in 
which New Zealand had no opportunity to participate. 
A. AUSFTA and Pharmaceuticals Trade 
The AU SIT A has the potential to affect Australian pharmaceutical prices in a 
couple of ways. First, certain TRIPS-plus intellectual property provisions have 
implications for medicines.2 5 In particular, relative to TRIPS, the agreement 
U. L. Rev. (2oo6) 29; Kingsbury, "Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional 
Free Trade Agreements: What Should New Zealand Expect from a New Zealand/United 
States Free Trade Agreement?," 10 NZ Bus. L. Q. (2004) 222. 
24 Mitchell, supra note 21, at u6. 
'5 The AUSFTA intellectual property commitments are in Chapter 17 of the agreement and in 
accompanying side letters. Provisions with specific implications for the provision of low-cost 
medicines include AUSFTA Art 17.9.8 (effectively extending the patent term for pharmaceu-
ticals); AUSFTAArt. 17·9·7 (limiting compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceuticals to the 
extent provided in TRIPS); and AUSFTA Art. 17·9·4 (limiting parallel importing). See also 
Kingsbury, supra note 23, at 233-
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provides narrower avenues for allowing compulsory licensing; an expanded 
scope for what is patentable; and minimum and extended terms of data protec-
tion and data exclusivity. It also prohibits parallel importation.>6 It additionally 
contains an "evergreening" notification provision/7 which requires that drug 
manufacturers be notified of any upcoming generic drug entry into the mar-
ket, and further requires that approval be denied to such generic drugs when 
a patent is "claimed" by a manufacturer that has not "consented or acqui-
esced" to the entry into the market of the generic drug.28 Although Australia 
introduced anti-evergreening provisions along with the AUSITA implement-
ing legislation to combat the possibility that this provision would lead to an 
increase in drug prices, such provisions were strongly criticized by the United 
States and it remains to be seen what would happen if a dispute arose over the · 
operation of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.29 
In addition to the TRIPS-plus provisions, the AUSITA requires regula-
tory dialogue between the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the Aus-
tralian Therapeutic Goods Association to speed up approvals of "innovative" 
medical products and emphasizes a linkage between innovation and high-
quality health care.3° Pursuant to AUSFTA, Australia had to make changes 
to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, including adding a review proce-
dure of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) drug-listing 
rejections.3' Although no changes were directly required to Australia's system 
of reference pricing, the United States had as a negotiating goal that that system 
be dismantledY Because of this, concerns have been raised that the combi-
nation of the various requirements will ultimately force Australia to abandon 
this cost-effective measure of setting drug prices.33 
26 Lopert and Rosenbaum, "What is Fair? Choice, Fairness, and Transparency in Access to 
Prescription Medicines in the United States and Australia," 35 f. L. Med. 6 Ethics (2007) 643, 
at 6so n. so. 
27 AUSFTAArt. 17.1o.4(a) and (b). 
28 Ibid.; see also Faunce et al., "Trans-Tasman," supra note 23, at 368--369 for a discussion of 
evergreening. 
29 Faunce et al., "Trans-Tasman," supra note 23, at 371-372. In the event a dispute were to arise, 
Faunce argues that to the extent the AUSFTA is textually ambiguous, Australia could rely on 
the anti-evergreening amendments as evidence of its expectation that Art. 17.10.4 would not 
lead to higher pharmaceutical prices under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. See ibid. 
for a discussion of the merits of the potential legal arguments that could be raised. 
3° AUSFTA Annex 2C(1), 2C(4). 
3' Faunce, "Reference Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Is the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement Affecting Australia's Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme?," 187:4 Med. J. Australia 
(2007) 240, at 240-242. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
Meredith Kolsky Lewis 
B. CER-A Unique Relationship 
Australia and New Zealand have a long history of economic partnership. They 
entered into a limited trade agreement in 1933,34 and they subsequently formed 
the original "NAFf A"- the New Zealand Australia Free Trade Agreement- in 
1965.35 This agreement removed So percent of the tariffs on trans-Tasman trade, 
but some restrictions remained. The remaining barriers included Australia's 
closed market for New Zealand dairy products and New Zealand's quantitative 
restrictions and various export incentives. In the early 198os, agreement was 
finally reached to remove these obstacles and the countries entered into the 
highly comprehensive ANZCERTA (commonly referred to as CER) in 1983. 
The parties subsequently entered into a protocol to accelerate the removal 
of all tariff barriers by 1990, which was a number of years earlier than called 
for in the CER Agreement.36 In connection with CER, the two countries 
have gone well beyond tariff liberalization and have contemplated - and in 
some cases already enacted- various forms of regulatory harmonization with 
respect to customs and quarantine procedures,37 In 1993, the two countries 
entered into the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA), 
which provides (subject to limited exceptions) that goods that may lawfully be 
sold in either country may be lawfully sold in the other,38 and (also subject to 
limited exceptions) that an individual licensed to practice a given occupation 
in one of the countries is entitled to practice the equivalent occupation in the 
other country.39 Although therapeutic goods legislation (such as Australia's 
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 and New Zealand's Medicines Act 1981) is cur-
rently exempted from the TTMRA, the TTMRA provides that it is a goal to 
ultimately incorporate therapeutic goods into the agreement. 
CER is a unique arrangement, among other reasons, because it has led to 
a significant degree of harmonization between Australia and New Zealand.40 
34 Trade Agreement of September 5, 1933· 
35 New Zealand Australia Free Trade Agreement, August 31, 1965. 
36 Protocol to the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement on 
Acceleration of Free Trade in Goods, Art. 1.1. 
37 See, e.g., Exchange of Letters and Joint Understanding of Harmonisation of Customs Policies 
and Procedures, August 16, 1988; Protocol on Harmonisation of Quarantine Administrative 
Procedures to the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, 
August 18, 1988. 
38 Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement Part IV, accessible at http://www.dfat.gov 
.au/geo/new ..zealand/ttrnra. pdf. 
39 Ibid., Part V. 
4" See, e.g., Rennie, "Competition Provisions in Free Trade Agreements: Unique Responses 
to Bilateral Needs or Derivative Developments in International Competition Policy," 15 Int. 
T.L.R. (2009) 57, at 64 (noting unique harmonization provisions of ANZCERTA). 
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It was formed with the belief that agreeing to joint procedures and prac-
tices would reduce transaction costs and enhance economic growth for both 
economies. Although there is often an expectation that the unified practice 
will more strongly resemble whatever Australia's system has been, rather than 
New Zealand's,41 New Zealand presumably has been willing to accept this bias 
in the instances where it has signed on to specific harmonization measures, in 
part because of the similarities between Australia and New Zealand's regula-
tory approaches. However, New Zealand would have made its decisions based 
on Australia's regulatory standards and procedures at the time. New Zealand 
likely would not have contemplated that Australia would subsequently sig-
nificantly alter certain parts of its regulatory framework pursuant to a future 
ITA, rendering aspects of its regulatory structure significantly different from 
their previously similar approach. Nevertheless, because of New Zealand's 
relatively weaker position with respect to Australia - and Australia's relative 
lack of bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States - Australia accepted the 
terms of AU SIT A notwithstanding its commitments under ANZCERTA and 
the implicit assumptions (of similar regulatory approaches) underlying those 
commitments. 
C. AUSFTA Implications for New Zealand 
As already noted, Australia and New Zealand have engaged in a range of har-
monization efforts as a result of specific CER commitments or more indirectly 
as a result of the general integration goal of CER. To the ext.ent that Australia 
has changed or will change certain of its regulatory frameworks pursuant to its 
obligations under the AUSFT A, New Zealand may find itself under pressure to 
do the same in the future. The most salient example of this phenomenon lies in 
the context of the regulation of therapeutic products (comprising medicines, 
medical devices, and complementary medicines and dietary supplements that 
have therapeutic uses).42 
In December 2003, New Zealand and Australia entered into an agreement to 
negotiate the creation of a joint agency to be called the Australia New Zealand 
Therapeutic Products Authority (ANZTPA), which would replace Australia's 
Therapeutic Goods Authority and New Zealand's equivalent, the Medicines 
and Medical Devices Safety Authority (known as Medsafe).43 ANZTPA would 
41 Compare Harpaz, supra note 2, with respect to EC-Israel relations. 
42 See generally Faunce et al., ''Trans-Tasman," supra note 23. 
43 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand for 
the Establishment of a Joint Scheme for the Regulation of Therapeutic Products (September 
9, 2003), accessible at http://www.anztpa.org/about/treatytext.pdf. 
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create harmonized regulations for therapeutic products that would apply to 
both countries. An eventual ANZTPA has been seen by both countries as "a 
significant step in the further development of a single economic market. "44 
ANZTPA was to have been created by 2oo6, but the New Zealand Labour-
led government (which was subsequently replaced in 2008 with a National-
led coalition) did not have the numbers necessary in Parliament to pass a 
version of the requisite legislation that would satisfy all interested parties.45 
In 2007, the project was officially placed on hold.46 Nonetheless, the original 
agreement remains in place and the bill will be revisited once sufficient votes 
are available.47 
In this context, significant concern was voiced in New Zealand that 
ANZTPA would inherit the heightened intellectual property obligations and 
pharmaceutical manufacturer protections that the United States imposed on 
Australia's Therapeutic Goods Authority by means of the AUSFTA.48 New 
Zealand's Health Committee raised these concerns - and those of New 
Zealand's Pharmaceutical Management Agency (Pharmac)- in its 2004 report 
on ANZTPA:49 
Pharmac noted a number of concerns ... including possible increases in the 
cost of generic drugs ... and possible increases in patent terms for medicines. 
In its written submission to us, Pharmac noted that ... the cost of these latter 
increases as a flow-on effect of the free trade agreement between Australia 
and the United States of America could amount to between $85 million and 
$135 million over 3 years. 
As of this writing, it remains to be seen whether Pharmac and the New 
Zealand Health Committee's concerns will keep ANZTPA on the back burner 
44 See "Australia and New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) Ministerial Com-
munique" (December u, 2004), accessible at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new..zealand/anz_ 
cer/cer_communique..zoo4-html. 
45 New Zealand has a Mixed Member Proportional representation system of government similar 
to that used in Germany. Therefore unless one political party wins an absolute majority of 
seats, there is a coalition government comprising two or more parties. Although the members 
of the coalition will often vote together, this is not the case on every issue. See, e.g., http://www. 
elections.org. nz/voting/mmp/. 
46 State Services Minister Annette King, "Therapeutics Products and Medicines Bill on 
Hold," Press Release (July 16, 2007), accessible at Http://Www.Beehive.Govt.Nz!Release/ 
Therapeutics+Products+And+Medicines+Bili+Hold. 
47 Ibid. 
~ Faunce eta!., "Trans-Tasman," supra note 23, at 367. 
49 New Zealand Health Committee, "International Treaty Examination of the Agreement 
Between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of Australia for the Establish-
ment of a Joint Scheme for the Regulation ofTherapeutic Products," (June 2004) 3, quoted in 
Faunce eta!., "Trans-Tasman," supra note 23, at 367. 
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indefinitely. Given the support among some members of Parliament, it seems 
more likely that at some point the legislation will be passed, the treaty signed, 
and ANZTPA will become a reality. However, in either case, the terms the 
United States extracted from Australia in the AU SIT A will affect New Zealand. 
If plans for ANZTPAwere scuttled as a resultoftheAUSFTA, this would mean 
that New Zealand felt it had to abandon a harmonization effort it otherwise 
intended to pursue. If, as is more likely, ANZTPA ultimately comes into being, 
the effects for New Zealand may be more significant, because it might need 
to adopt the AUSITA standards to effectuate the authority- and see costs 
increase as a result. The political reality for New Zealand is, unfortunately, 
that Australia will likely be able to dictate the terms of ANZTPA by virtue of 
its preexisting commitments under the AUSFTA- commitments to a trading· 
partner more powerful than New Zealand. This is a concrete example of 
a negotiation phenomenon that Oona Hathaway has explained in terms of 
sequencing path dependence: "The power to set the agenda can thus become, 
in a very real sense, the power to determine the result."5° 
Thus, in the absence of AUSITA, New Zealand and Australia had similar 
regulatory approaches to pharmaceuticals and likely could have harmonized 
their regulatory schemes relatively easily. Now, however, New Zealand finds 
itself in a very different situation as a result of the spillover effects of the 
AUSFTA- an agreement to which it is not a party, in which it had no ne-
gotiating role, and from which it receives no benefits. 
New Zealand may be faced with preordained AUSFTA terms in a differ-
ent context as well. The United States is currently seeking to join the Trans-
Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (also known as the P-4 
Agreement), which now comprises New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, and 
Brunei DarussalamY Initial negotiations on financial services and investment 
have already been conducted. Further negotiations, geared toward having the 
United States join the agreement in its entirety, as well as the additional partic-
ipation of Australia and Peru, were scheduled to occur in March 2009. These 
negotiations have been put on hold temporarily while the Obama adminis-
tration conducts a review of its trade policy and decides which of the various 
Ff A negotiations initiated by the Bush administration it wishes to continue to 
pursue. Although these negotiations have therefore been temporarily delayed, 
it seems likely this is merely procedural and that the Obama administration 
will decide to resume the negotiations. With the United States already having 
5° Hathaway, supra note 17, at 618-619. 
5' The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, Wf/REG229 S/C/N/394, entry 
into force May 28, 2oo6. 
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concluded FfAs with Australia, Peru, Chile, and Singapore, it seems highly 
likely that the United States will expect New Zealand and Brunei Darussalam 
to agree to at least some of the measures found in the FTAs the United States 
has with the other expanded P-4 agreement partnersY 
The AUSFTA therefore provides an example of an ITA in which the 
weaker party, Australia, has capitulated to TRIPS-plus provision and other 
terms that WTO members collectively have successfully resisted incorporating 
into multilateral trade agreements. This may be a bargained-for exchange in 
the case of Australia and the gains it sought to obtain under the.AUSFfA, but 
the bargaining process did not take into account the negative externalities of 
these terms impacting New Zealand. It is problematic that New Zealand finds 
itself with unexpected, undesirable regulatory choices as a result of political 
power being exercised in an agreement it had no role in negotiating. 
Although New Zealand may be the victim of path dependence and FTA 
politics in the case of flow-on effects of the AUSFT A or in the case of the P-4 
expansion, it is on the other side of the equation in the role of a "big brother 
behaving badly"53 in the context of the Pacific region, as is discussed in the 
following section. 
3· PICTA, PACER, AND THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENTS: PACIFIC ISLANDS NATIONS BETWEEN 
A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 
Pacific Islands countries have had historical ties to Europe as a result of 
colonization, and to Australia and New Zealand largely as a result of sheer 
proximity.54 Many countries in the Pacific are a part of the ACP group of 
countries (Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific) that comprise former European 
colonies. The ACP group historically benefited from preferential access to 
European markets based on the colonial relationships. However, providing 
preferential access to former colonies to the exclusion of other developing 
countries was recognized to be a violation of the MFN principle enshrined 
5' Rennie, supra note 40, at 71 (noting the path-dependent nature of bilateral FTA provisions 
whereby terms become a reflection of common practice rather than the particular needs of the 
parties). In the case of pharmaceuticals protection, the United States has negotiated similar 
terms to the AUSFTA provisions in its FTA with Korea. 
53 See, generally, Kelsey, supra note 20. 
54 The Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau are part of the Realm of New Zealand. The Cook Islands 
and Niue are in free association with New Zealand. Tokelau has taken steps toward free associ-
ation but has less autonomy than the Cooks or Niue. See http://www.gg.govt.nz/role/constofnz. 
htm for information regarding New Zealand's constitutional structure. 
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in GATI Article I. Article I provides in relevant part that "any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties."55 It is inconsistent with the MFN 
principle for Europe to give preferential tariff access to ACP countries while not 
providing this same access to other WI'O members. 56 Furthermore, providing 
the ACP countries with comprehensive market access to the EU under the 
arrangements established under the Lome Conventions did not create a free 
trade area or areas pursuant to Article XXIV because of the nonreciprocal 
nature of the arrangements. 57 
As a result of the MFN-inconsistent nature of the historical preferences, · 
the EU sought and successfully received a waiver from the GATT and later 
the WI'O that permitted it to maintain its preferential treatment of the ACP 
countries notwithstanding its obligations pursuant to Article I GATI, within 
the Lome framework. This waiver was extended in 2000, but it ultimately 
expired in December 2007. As a result, the EU, on the one hand, and the ACP 
countries, on the other, have had to decide what, if anything, will replace the 
historical preferences. Without any new agreements, the waiver would expire 
and the EU would then need to apply its tariff schedules on an MFN basis 
with respect to the ACP countries. Although other exceptions would apply in 
certain instances and for certain products by means of the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP) schemes for developing countries and Europe's Every-
thing but Arms program for least developed countries, this coverage would 
not be comprehensive. For example, sugar, which is one of Fiji's most impor-
tant exports and which is currently the subject of a protocol to promote such 
55 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Art. !.1. 
56 The long-running EC-Bananas dispute has highlighted this inconsistency. See "European 
Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas," WfO Doc. 
Wf/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997), panel report. 
57 The EC had also attempted to argue to the contrary in the second GATT panel examination 
of the EC's bananas program. The panel (whose report was not adopted) stated that the 
lack of reciprocal trade liberalization obligations made the Lome Convention arrangements 
"substantially different from those of a free trade area, as defined in the Article XXIV:S(b )."See 
"EEC- Import Regime for Bananas," WfO Doc. DS38/R (February u, 1994), panel report, 
para. 159· The panel noted that if such arrangements did fall within Article XXIV:S(b) there 
would have been little need for the contracting parties to reach decisions regarding Generalized 
System of Preferences schemes and the Enabling Clause. Ibid., para. 162. For a detailed 
discussion of the GATT -era panel reports in the Bananas dispute, see J. H. Mathis, Regional 
Trade Agreements in the GATf/WfO: Article XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirement (2002.), 
at 88-<)7. 
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exports,58 is not included in the EU's GSP scheme. 59 Rather than broaden its. 
GSP scheme coverage to enable the ACP countries to maintain their nonre-
ciprocal market access to the EU, the EU instead proposed that it enter into 
a series of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the ACP countries 
(in six regional groups )00 to take the place of the waiver. The concept was that 
the EPAs would satisfy the definition of free trade areas under GATT Arti-
cle XXIV, 61 and therefore the tariff treatment granted under such agreements 
would not need to be extended to other WTO members on an MFN basis and 
would not be subject to waiver approval. Thus the ACP countries would be 
able to maintain their existing preferential access to the EU market. 
A difficulty for the ACP countries, however, has been that acceding to the 
EPAs would require them to provide substantial, comprehensive market access 
to the EU. Previously, under the waiver, the EU provided preferential market 
access to the ACP states, but it did not demand reciprocal market access in 
return. Thus, the ACP countries have been faced with a choice: Should they 
sacrifice their preferential access to the European Union but maintain their 
own tariffs on goods originating from its members, or should they instead opt 
to enter an EPA, thus formalizing their preferential access to the European 
Union but at the cost of having to provide significant new market access in 
return?62 
To complicate matters further for Pacific Island countries, once the EU 
made clear its intention to replace ACP preferences with reciprocal trade 
arrangements in the form ofEP As, Australia and New Zealand orchestrated the 
Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations, known as PACER, which 
58 The ACPIEU Sugar Protocol is an agreement by which the EU agrees to purchase set quan-
tities of sugar from the ACP countries. It was originally annexed to the Fourth ACPIEU 
Lome Convention. Upon the expiry of the Lome Convention, the protocol was subsequently 
incorporated into the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, June 23, 2000. 
59 See, e.g., Curran, "Response to the Article 'Are the Economic Partnership Agreements a First-
Best Outcome for the ACP Countries?' Perez, R. (2oo6) 40(6)," 41 /Wf (2007) 243, at 244 
(noting that certain products important to ACP countries are excluded even from proposed 
GSP-plus formulations). 
6o There is a Caribbean group, Central African group, East and Southern African Group, South 
Africa Development Community group, West African group, and a Pacific group. 
6
• Article XXN:8(b) defines a free trade area as "a group of two or more customs territories 
in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce . . . are eliminated on 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such 
territories." 
6> One analysis has suggested that ACP countries would be better off declining to enter into 
EPAs and relying instead on the EU's GSP scheme (in the case of developing countries) and 
Everything but Arms program (in the case of least developed countries). See Perez, "Are the 
Economic Partnership Agreements a First-Best Optimum for the African Caribbean Pacific 
Countries?," 40 /Wf (2oo6) 999· 
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calls for fundamental changes to the relationship be~een the Pacific Islands 
Forum or PIF countries on the one hand and Australia and New Zealand on 
the other. If an EPA with the EU is entered into, the PIF countries will likely 
trigger obligations under PACER to begin negotiating an FTA with Australia 
and New Zealand. Indeed, several meetings of the PACER parties were held 
in 2008 and 2009 to discuss when and how to commence negotiations for a 
future agreement, which is being referred to as "PACER-Plus."63 
The PIF countries have reason to want to avoid triggering these negotiations. 
Although the Pacific's imports from Europe are not particularly substantial,64 
they are much more significant from Australia and New Zealand. For example, 
in 2007, New Zealand exported NZ $786.5 million in merchandise to PIF 
countries.65 Likewise, Australia's exports to the Pacific are substantial and 
significantly in excess of its imports from the region.66 It has been predicted 
that, should the PIF countries have to lower their tariffs on goods entering 
from New Zealand and Australia, there will be significant losses of revenue. 
This lost tariff income- estimated as approximately U.S. $no million- will 
represent losses of up to 12 to 19 percent of national income for some PIF 
countries.67 In addition, some forecast that upward of 75 percent of Pacific 
manufacturing will have to cease operations under PACER-Plus.68 
A. Historical Preferences from Australia and New Zealand 
Not unlike the arrangements the EU had with the ACP countries pursuant to 
the Lome Conventions, New Zealand and Australia have long been providing 
63 For a discussion of these meetings see Pacific Institute of Public Policy, "PACER Plus: The 
Art of Negotiation," Briefing Paper (May 2009), accessible at www.pacificpolicy.org. 
64 Approximately 3 percent of Pacific imports come from the EU. See the European Commis-
sion, Directorate-General for Trade and Directorate-General for Development, "Trading for 
Development: An European Union-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement," (2007), at 5, 
accessible at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docshoo7/june/tradoc-134815.pdf. 
65 Nearly half of this total went to Fiji. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Key 
Pacific Issues- Trade" (August 20, 2009), accessible at www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/ 
Pacific/Trade/index.php. 
66 Close to half of the Solomon Islands' imports come from Australia; in 2001-2002 this rep-
resented AU $64 million in trade, whereas the Solomons only exported AU $2 million in 
merchandise to Australia. In 2002-2003, Australia exported AU h8 million to Kiribati but only 
imported a negligible AU $285,000 in merchandise from Kiribati. See Kim, "Howard's Pacific 
Colonialism: Who Benefits?," .Centre for Research on Globalisation-Giobal Research (July 
27, 2005), accessible at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=742· 
67 Ibid., at 2. 
68 See, e.g., Cordemans, "Pacific Islands Bullied by Australian, NZ Trade Officials, Say Experts," 
The Epoch Times (May 30, 2009, quoting Pacific Network on Globalisation statements that 8o 
percent of manufacturing could close down). 
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preferential treatment to Pacific Island countries. The South Pacific Regional 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), which came 
into force in 1981, is a nonreciprocal agreement among the members of the 
South Pacific Forum69 that provides duty-free access into Australia and New 
Zealand markets for goods from PIF members.7° 
It is unclear how it came to pass that SPARTECA was able to be notified 
to the GATT as a partial scope agreement pursuant to the Enabling Clause.7' 
The Enabling Clause allows for certain arrangements that would not other-
wise be permissible under GATT Article XXIV. In particular, the Enabling 
Clause is the legal basis in the WfO for GSP schemes. It also permits regional 
arrangements among developing countries, and the Global System of Trade 
Preferences pursuant to which various developing countries provide reciprocal 
trade concessions to one another.72 However, the Enabling Clause does not 
permit agreements whereby developed countries give nonreciprocal prefer-
ences to subsets of developing countries, outside of the GSP context. This has 
been precisely the problem with the EC's long-standing preferences granted 
to the ACP states, and why waivers have been necessary in order for the EC to 
provide preferential, nonreciprocal treatment to the ACP countries.73 
Notwithstanding the scope of the Enabling Clause, however, SPARTECA 
was notified pursuant to the Enabling Clause even though it involves the 
developed member countries of Australia and New Zealand providing nonre-
ciprocal preferential market access only to the Pacific Island countries. Unlike 
the EC's Lome and Cotonou arrangements, there is no apparent expiration 
6<) The original members of SPARTECA were Australia, New Zealand, and the members of the 
South Pacific Forum - the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa. SPARTECA Article XIV.1. 
7° The text of SPARTECA may be found at, inter alia, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/ 
agreements/spartecafta.pdf. 
7' "SPARTECA Enabling Clause Preferential Arrangement," GATT Doc. L/5100 (February 20, 
1981). 
72 "Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participa-
tion of Developing Countries," GATT Doc. L/4903, BISD 26Sho3 (November 28, 1979). 
73 The initial waiver was granted by the GATT contracting parties on December 9, 1994, just 
prior to the entry into effect of the WTO, to the preferences the EU was granting to ACP 
countries pursuant to the Fourth Lome Convention. This waiver was extended on October 14, 
1995 until February 29, 2ooo, "EC -The Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lome -Extension 
of Waiver- Decision of 14 October 1996," WTO Doc. WT/Lh86 (October 18, 1996). At the 
Doha Ministerial Conference a further waiver was granted to permit the EU to continue 
providing preferences pursuant to the interim Cotonou Agreement until December 31, 2007; 
"Ministerial Conference - Fourth Session - Doha, 9-14 November 2001 - European Com-
munities - The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement - Decision of 4 November 2001," WTO 
Doc. WT/MIN(m)h5 (November 14, 2001). See also Nwobike, "The Emerging Trade Regime 
under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement: Its Human Rights Implications," 40 JWT (2oo6) 
291, at 294 n. 24· 
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date for SPARTECA's status.74 Thus, for many years the PIF countries have 
received unilateral trade preferences from Australia and New Zealand. Once 
it became clear the EU was going to attempt to negotiate EPAs with the Pacific 
ACP countries, however, Australia and New Zealand developed an interest in 
reciprocal relationships as well. 
B. PICTA and PACER 
PACER is an agreement among Australia and New Zealand, on the one hand, 
and the fourteen countries then comprising the Forum Island Countries75 
(Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji Islands, Kiribati, Republic 
of Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Republic of Palau, Papua New Guinea,· 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu), on the other.76 
PACER is described as an umbrella agreement under which the Pacific Island 
Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA)77 and other arrangements fall; it is not 
intended in and of itself to be a trade agreement that requires notification 
pursuant to GATT Article XXIV.78 
At present the agreement is asymmetrical, providing that Australia and New 
Zealand will maintain "all existing arrangements with respectto market access" 
for any Forum Island Country until such time as "that particular Forum Island 
Country has concluded new and/or improved trade arrangements providing 
equal or better access to" Australia and New Zealand's markets.79 Forum 
Island Countries are not expected to make any immediate market access 
concessions to Australia or New Zealand; instead, the agreement contemplates 
that these countries will integrate among themselves first, in the form of 
74 See also Onguglo, "Developing Countries and Unilateral Trade Preferences in the Interna-
tional Trading System," in M. R Mendoza, P. Low, and B. Kotschwar (eds.), Trade Rules 
in the Making: Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations (1999), accessible at 
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/deveLe/semoi-e/ongugLe.doc (referring to SPARTECA 
and GSP as permanent exceptions under the Enabling Clause). 
75 The Forum Island countries are also referred to as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) members. 
76 The Pacific Islands Forum suspended Fiji from its membership on May 2, 2009. See, e.g., 
Cordemans, supra note 68. 
n PICTA is an agreement among the Forum Island countries; neither Australia nor New Zealand 
is a party. 
78 PACER Article 3· 7(a) makes this statement: "This Agreement is not intended to be: a customs 
union, an interim agreement leading to the formation of a customs union, a free trade area, 
or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a free trade area notifiable under Article 
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." Article 3-7(b) further explains that 
the agreement is not intended to be an agreement notifiable under Article V of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
79 PACER Article 5·3· 
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PI CT A. So However, eight years after PI CT A comes into force, negotiations will 
begin "with a view to establishing reciprocal free trade agreements between 
the Forum Island Countries and Australia and New Zealand."81 Consultations 
leading to negotiations to form a reciprocal trade agreement with Australia and 
New Zealand can be triggered earlier, however, if a Forum Island Country 
enters into a trade agreement (as defined by GATT Article XXIV:8) with a 
developed non-Forum country with a per capita GOP higher than the lowest 
per capita GOP of a developed Forum member,82 or if all the PICTA countries 
jointly enter into negotiations to form a trade agreement with one or more non-
Forum members.83 It is these provisions- drafted with the EU's EPA plans 
in mind- that seem to have served as significant motivation for Australia and 
New Zealand to negotiate this agreement.84 
PICTA came into force in 2003. Accordingly, the Forum Island Coun-
tries are to begin consultations with Australia and New Zealand by 2011 with 
respect to negotiating an ITA. However, should the Pacific ACP states enter 
into an EPA before then, negotiations with Australia and New Zealand will 
have to begin at that time. Further complications arise for the three Pacific 
ACP states (Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and Marshall Islands) that 
have a Compact of Free Association with the United States. As with PACER, 
the Compact requires that the United States should receive market access as 
favorable as that provided to any other country.85 Thus, for these three coun-
tries, any EPA assessment must take into account the extension of duty-free 
access not only to Australia and New Zealand but to U.S. exports as well.86 
C. Pacific Islands in the Balance 
The PIF countries now find themselves in a difficult position. Their ACP 
preferences have expired, leaving them with the choice of negotiating an 
EPA or relying on alternative sources of preferences. The former is fraught 
Bo PACER Article 4.1. 
8
' PACER Article 5.1. 
82 PACER Article 6.3(b). 
83 PACER Article 6+ 
!4 For example, Australia's national interest analysis of PACER emphasizes the benefit of get-
ting MFN treatment if Forum Island countries negotiate an ITA with a developed coun-
try with a higher GDP than Australia or New Zealand; see http://www.aph.gov.au/House/ 
committee/jsctii2March2oo2/pacernia.pdf. 
85 See, e.g., Compact of Free Association between the Federated States of Micronesia and the 
United States (as amended 2004), Title 2, Art. IV, Section 243· 
86 Dearden, "The Interim Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement," DSA European Develop-
ment Policy Study Group Discussion Paper No. 36 (March 2oo8), at 4- See also http://www 
.forumsec.org.fj/_resources/article/files/FAQ%2o-%2oPICTA%2o&%2oPACER.pdf. 
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with difficulty- the EPA should ideally be an agreement that is sufficiently 
comprehensive to satisfy Article XXIV but not so comprehensive as to trigger 
obligations under PACER. This is a combination that may not be feasible.87 
Thus, there is a real risk that if an EPA is entered into, preferential access 
will also have to be extended to Australia and New Zealand a number of years 
earlier than it otherwise would. As already noted, Pacific Island countries do 
not import much from Europe, but they do import significant volumes from 
Australia and New Zealand. Entering into reciprocal trading arrangements 
with Australia and New Zealand would entail lowering tariffs on products 
from these countries, which would have significant consequences for the 
small local economies.88 The other option is to decline to negotiate an EPA. 
On the export side of things, Europe is not a major export market for most · 
Pacific Island countries; however, they still do not want to lose their preferential 
access. The EU's GSP scheme does not cover certain important exports for 
Pacific economies, such as sugar, and it is unlikely it would be willing to 
dramatically expand its GSP scheme as such preferences have to be offered on 
a generalized basis to all similarly situated developing countries.89 In this way, 
declining to enter into an EPA would have potential negative consequences 
for export volumes. 
The Pacific Island countries have next to no bargaining power when dealing 
with their stronger regional partners, Australia and New Zealand. Not only are 
Australia and New Zealand the main export markets for these economies, but 
they are the source of many imports. Pacific Island nations receive a great deal 
of their financial assistance from Australia and New Zealand, and many of 
their citizens attend school or work (or both) in these developed neighboring 
countries. Thus, although the PIF countries entered into PACER with New 
Zealand and Australia, this does not mean all parties saw the agreement as 
equally beneficial. Indeed, the Forum countries felt significant pressure to 
87 This may not be impossible, however. Whether it is due to poor drafting or intentional design, 
PACER appears to give some wiggle room to the Forum Island countries to negotiate an 
agreement with the EU that would not trigger obligations to negotiate with Australia and New 
Zealand, but only if the EPA covered trade other than goods, i.e., services and investment. 
Although the EU agreed to begin EPA negotiations within these sectors, it is clear it wants 
to have goods incorporated into an agreement, whether that be in the form of an EPA or a 
separate goods arrangement. See Articles 5 and 6 PACER; Kelsey, "Free Trade Agreements-
Boon or Bane? Through the Lens of PACER," 37 Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev. (2oo6) 391, at 
398-400 (explaining the lack of clarity in these provisions and the implications of the potential 
interpretations). 
88 Tariffs provide between 20 and 50 percent of government revenue for the Pacific Island 
countries. See Kelsey, supra note 87 at 412. 
&J See "European Communities- Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Develop-
ing Countries," Wf/DS246/ABIR (April7, 2004), Appellate Body report. 
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enter into PACER. Although the Forum has proven a useful entity for Pacific 
Island members in the context of their multilateral trade concerns, it is less 
helpful in the regional context when it is members of the Forum itself-
Australia and New Zealand- that are pushing difficult decisions.90 
4- CONCLUSION 
The multilateral trading system provides a better prospect than do FTAs for 
weaker countries to obtain meaningful trade access to their stronger trading 
partners' markets.9' Furthermore, weaker countries may be less susceptible to 
political pressures in the multilateral context where they constitute a majority 
than in the bilateral or plurilateral setting. Path dependence is also more of 
a problem in the bilateral-plurilateral context, where "cookie cutter" agree-
ment provisions can easily become default rules. Notwithstanding most WTO 
members' preference for the multilateral forum, given the uncertain timing 
and scope for a completed Doha Round, it is likely that the next several years 
will see members continue to flock to enter into new bilateral and pluri-
lateral arrangements. Developing and developed countries alike, no matter 
how committed to the WTO in theory, will feel the need to enter into FTAs 
at a minimum to avoid losing their comparative advantage as their trading 
competitors pair up with common export target countries.92 
Unfortunately, as this chapter has shown, the political influence stronger 
countries can exert in bilateral and plurilateral negotiations not only has 
direct effects on the weaker parties to the negotiations, but can also have 
flow-on effects for countries not directly tied to the agreements. Unfavorable 
provisions arise initially out of the political dominance of stronger negotiat-
ing partners such as the United States, the EU, and- relative to the Pacific-
Australia and New Zealand. Although these provisions are perhaps problematic 
for the multilateral trading system as they proliferate, in the first instance they 
9° Bowman, "The Pacific Island Nations: Towards Shared Representation," in P. Gallagher, P. 
Low, and A. L. Stoler (eds.), Managing the Challenges of WfO Participation (2005), Case 
Study 33 (discussing the benefits for the Pacific Island WfO members of having the Pacific 
Islands Forum Representative Office to assist with participating in WfO negotiations and 
resolving disputes on a regional rather than a country-specific basis). 
9' But see Blum, "Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture oflnternational Law," 49 
Harv. Int'l L. J. (2oo8) 323, at 339-343 (identifying instances when bilateral settings may be 
more advantageous for weaker states than multilateral settings). 
92 For a discussion of this phenomenon see Lewis, "The Free Trade Agreement Paradox," 21 
NZ U. L. Rev. (2005) 554; Lewis, "The Prisoners' Dilemma and Free Trade Agreements: An 
Application of Game Theory to Trade Liberalization Strategy," in Boulle et al. (eds.), supra 
note 22, at 21-39. 
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were accepted by the weaker parties to these trade agreements and thus may 
seem legitimate. However, as the two examples provided demonstrate, such 
provisions can have impacts outside the parameters of the original agreement. 
These negative externalities are not the result of a bargained-for exchange. 
As FTAs continue to proliferate, we can expect political influence to con-
tinue to have ripple effects far beyond the scope of any given agreement. 
This creates legitimacy concerns, because it is not equitable for FTAs to con-
strain the policy options of countries that are not party to those agreements, 
whether through path-dependent externalities of boilerplate provisions or, as 
demonstrated through the examples of AUSTFA and PACER, through more 
particularized dynamics existing between trading partners. In contemplating 
potential reforms to GATT Article XXIV, WTO members should address the 
fact that political asymmetry in FTA negotiations produces negative external-
ities on third parties to FTAs, and that these externalities further undermine 
the legitimacy of such agreements in general. 
